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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
WESTERN DIVISION
JEANNE SPENCER,
Plaintiff,
v.
NATIONAL CITY BANK, et al., 
Defendants.
Case No. 1:09cv096
Chief Judge Dlott
ORDER GRANTING IN PART 
AND DENYING IN PART 
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 
22.) Plaintiff Jeanne Spencer brought this action against her former employer, National City 
Bank (“National City” or the “Bank”), and its parent company, The PNC Financial Services 
Group, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”) asserting claims for age discrimination in violation of 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §621 etseq, and Chapter 
4112 of the Ohio Revised Code. Plaintiff also asserts claims for disability discrimination in 
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq, and 
Chapter 4112 of the Ohio Revised Code. Plaintiff further alleges claims for interference and 
retaliation in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2611. Finally, 
Plaintiff asserts a claim for defamation per se.
Defendants move for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff has not 
disputed Defendants’ motion as to the FMLA interference and defamation claims. (Doc. 26.) 
Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ motion on the remaining claims. For the reasons that follow, the 
Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the FMLA interference and
AUTHENTICATED , 
U.S. GOVERNMENT^ 
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defamation claims and DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the remaining 
claims.
I. BACKGROUND1
The facts of this case arise from Plaintiff’s resignation in lieu of termination from her 
employment at National City. Plaintiff, born in 1946, worked as a Customer Services 
Representative (“CSR”), or teller, at National City’s retail branch office in Brentwood, Ohio 
(“Brentwood Branch”). She was hired as a CSR in 2001,2 was promoted to Senior CSR in 2005, 
and worked in that capacity until she resigned in lieu of termination, effective February 1, 2008, 
when she was 61 years old.
A. Plaintiffs Meniere’s Disease
Prior to her employment with National City, Plaintiff was diagnosed with Meniere’s 
Disease. This disorder affects Plaintiff’s hearing and balance, resulting in constant tinnitus and 
episodes of vertigo. (Id. at 124:9-11.) Meniere’s Disease also causes progressive hearing loss 
and, as a result, Plaintiff is deaf in her left ear and has reduced hearing in her right ear. (Id. at 
44:14-45:3; 74:4-10.) Four or five times per year, Plaintiff experiences severe episodes where 
she is not able to stand or eat, and is extremely sensitive to light. (Id. at 124:24-125:22.)
Outside of these extreme episodes, Plaintiff can drive a car, walk five blocks, grocery shop, 
perform household chores, and exercise at a gym.
1 Except as otherwise indicated, background facts are taken from Defendants’ Proposed 
Statement of Undisputed Facts (doc. 22-2) to the extent they are admitted by Plaintiff in 
Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Proposed Undisputed Facts (doc. 26-3). To the extent the 
parties do not explicitly agree on any statement of fact, the Court cites to the portion of the 
record providing support for the statement.
2 Plaintiff was originally hired by Provident Bank. (Spencer Dep. Ex. 5.) National City 
acquired Provident Bank in 2004. (Id. at 96:10-13.)
2
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B. Plaintiff’s Employment with the Bank
As a CSR, Plaintiff was responsible for balancing her cash drawer at the end of each day 
and meeting sales, referral and customer services goals, among other things. (Id. at 41-42.) 
Plaintiff informed the Bank of her Meniere’s Disease and requested that she be able to sit in a 
chair while she worked. Plaintiff testified that she raised the issue of her hearing loss with her 
superiors and that they subsequently placed her at a branch where the “noise level was not so 
great.” (Id. at 119:16-20.) In seven years of employment with the Bank, Plaintiff missed only a 
couple of days of work because of her Meniere’s Disease.
Although Plaintiff received multiple honors for exceeding her referral goals and for 
outstanding customer service (Justice Dep. 55:4-56:9; Burchett Dep. 93:4-94:3), Plaintiff 
admittedly struggled with balancing her cash drawer. The Bank’s written policies required 
managers to perform audits on each CSR’s assigned cash drawer to ensure that CSRs were 
maintaining accurate records and not diverting funds. Each branch office was required to 
conduct at least one surprise audit on each CSR’s cash drawer on a quarterly basis and one 
monthly random surprise audit of a CSR’s cash drawer. Additional surprise audits could be 
performed “at the discretion of the Branch Manager or Retail Manager.” (Doc. 26 Ex. A.) If the 
amount of cash in the CSR’s drawer did not equal the amount reflected on the Bank’s computer 
system, this would be termed a “shortage” or “outage.”
CSRs’ outages were tracked on a yearly rolling basis. (Perko Decl. Ex. 3) If an 
employee’s outages reached a Level 1 loss (between $200 - $499.99) or a Level 2 loss (between 
$500 - $999.99), the Bank’s guidelines recommended that the employee be given a verbal or 
written warning. If an employee’s outages reached a Level 3 loss (between $1,000 - $1,599.99) 
or a Level 4 loss ($1,600 or greater), the Bank’s guidelines provided that “probation or 
termination should be considered.” (Spencer Dep. Ex. 20.)
3
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C. Plaintiff’s First Probationary Period
Between August 7, 2001 and November 19, 2004, the Bank issued six separate written 
“corrective actions” to Plaintiff and eventually placed Plaintiff on probation for outages, 
balancing differences, and other policy violations. Many of the corrective actions, which were 
issued by multiple supervisors, explicitly state that Plaintiff’s position could be terminated if 
Plaintiff continued to sustain outages. (Id. Exs. 7, 9.) Plaintiff does not dispute any of these 
corrective actions, nor does she claim that they were discriminatory. In fact, in her 2004 self 
assessment, Plaintiff wrote: “I need to cut-down (stop) any errors I hastily make . . . . I need to 
be more consistent with my balancing.” Despite her issues with balancing, Plaintiff was 
promoted to Senior CSR in 2005.
D. Plaintiff’s Second Probationary Period
At the end of 2005, Plaintiff received a corrective action because she was out of balance; 
a surprise audit raised her rolling year-to-date shortage to a Level 2 loss. In May of 2006, then 
Branch Manager Mark Burchett issued Plaintiff her second probationary notice because her 
rolling loss balance had reached $3,164.58, a Level 4 loss. The probationary notice provided 
that if Plaintiff’s losses increased by $200 or more, Plaintiff would “face further corrective action 
up to and including termination.” (Id. Ex. 22.)
E. Plaintiff’s Third Probationary Period
By the beginning of 2007, Plaintiff’s losses persisted and her rolling loss balance reached 
$4,976.89, a Level 4 loss. At this time, Burchett considered terminating Spencer’s employment, 
but instead opted to place Plaintiff on her third probationary period in an effort to give Plaintiff 
“a chance to correct [her] behaviors.” (Burchett Dep. 75:15-16.) The probationary notice read, 
“Demonstration of immediate, continuous and sustained improvement is required. Failure to 
meet expectations may result in termination of your employment.” (Spencer Dep. Ex. 24.)
4
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F. New Management—and Fourth Probationary Period
Soon after that occurrence, in May of 2007, the Bank terminated Burchett and assigned 
Kathleen Perko to the position of Branch Manager of the Brentwood Branch.3 Perko instituted a 
number of new policies at the Brentwood Branch. (Perko Dep. 75:19-76:6.) First, Perko 
implemented “3-3-4 Quick Audits,” which were performed on tellers to ensure that each teller 
had only $3,000 in the top drawer, $3,000 in the middle drawer, and $4,000 in the coin vault. 
Perko also created biweekly coaching sessions, in which an employee’s strengths and areas of 
improvement would be discussed. (Id. at 30: 14-17.) Additionally, Perko created a Critical 
Incident Log, a file that was used to document various policy violations. (Id. at 76:1-77:18.)
Although the exact timeframe is unclear from the record, Plaintiff claims that soon after 
Perko’s arrival she was subjected to substantial scrutiny. For example, Plaintiff claims that she 
was subjected to significantly more audits than her younger coworkers once Perko arrived. (Id.) 
The parties appear to dispute the total number of audits performed on Plaintiff’s cash drawer. 
The Bank maintained a “Surprise Audit Control Log,” which recorded the Brentwood Branch’s 
quarterly surprise audits and random monthly audits. (Spencer Dep. Ex. 31.) According to the 
Log, the Bank conducted four quarterly surprise audits and two scheduled surprise audits on 
Plaintiff’s drawer in 2007.4 (Id.) The Log does not include the total number of 3-3-4 Quick 
Audits, nor does it document additional surprise audits performed on the CSRs’ drawers. (See 
id.)
3 Burchett was terminated for “failure to meet unit goals.” (Burchett Dep. 36:19-20.) 
Burchett initially filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging 
age discrimination. (Id. at 37:2-38:11.) Burchett’s allegations were determined to be 
“unfounded” and Burchett testified that he now believes his termination was justified and that he 
was simply “mad” at the time he file the EEOC charge. (Id. at 38:16-17.) Coincidentally, 
Burchett is currently a Branch Manager at PNC Bank in West Chester. (Id. at 7:17-24.)
4 February 8, 2007 and August 14, 2007.
5
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The record shows that Plaintiff received at least three, and possibly four, 3-3-4 Quick 
Audits in August of 2007.5 Another CSR, Maria Ahmed, who worked at the Bank while Perko 
was Branch Manager, testified that she did not recall ever receiving a 3-3-4 Quick Audit.
(Ahmed Dep. 24:2-5.) Plaintiff’s drawer was not in compliance during two of these 3-3-4 Quick 
Audits and, consequently, the Bank issued Plaintiff a “Performance Improvement Directive 
Counseling and Action Plan” on August 14, 2007 and August 17, 2007. (Spencer Dep. Exs. 26, 
28.) Both written counselings indicate that Plaintiff’s drawer would be further audited to 
monitor improvement. (Id.) The written counselings also state: “Failure to meet expectations 
may result in probationary disciplinary action or termination of your employment.” (Id.)
On August 10, 2007, Plaintiff sustained an outage of $733.00, which brought her rolling 
losses for the year to $2,408.57, a Level 4 loss. (Id. Ex. 33.) Following this loss, Perko 
contacted the Bank’s Human Resources Department, which recommended a fourth probationary 
period for Plaintiff. (Perko Dep. 58:24-60:8; Patterson Dep. Ex. 1.) The probationary notice 
provided, in relevant part:
If [Plaintiff] has a loss of $100 or more or her cumulative loss reaches $100 
within the 90 day probationary period and a correction is not made to reverse 
these losses within 7 business days of happening, [Plaintiff] will face further 
disciplinary action up to termination. Also, after the probation period ends and 
there continue to be Loss Counseling Notices sent, [Plaintiff] may be subject to 
termination without another probationary period.
(Spencer Dep. Ex. 33.)
During this timeframe—between May 2007 and January 2008), Plaintiff claims that 
Perko and Office Manager Heather Stone made discriminatory comments about Plaintiffs’ age 
and disability. For example, Plaintiff testified that Stone criticized Plaintiff’s “flailing
5 August 14, 2007, August 16, 2007, August 17, 2007 (Spencer Dep. Exs. 26, 28, 29) and 
possibly August 23, 2007 (Stone Dep. 75-77, Ex. 6).
6
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movements” when she would attempt to open the door for customers. (Spencer Dep. 47:7-22; 
72:6-73:8.) These movements, Plaintiff alleges, resulted from vertigo associated with her 
Meniere’s Disease. (Id.) Abraham Chacra, another CSL at the Bank, testified that Perko 
complained that Plaintiff was “too slow.” (Chacra Dep. 60:10-19.) There is also evidence that 
Ahmed overheard two employees, including Kelly Reichle, the Brentwood Branch’s Customer 
Service Leader, “snickering and laughing” and making fun of Plaintiff’s hearing loss. (Ahmed 
Dep. 50:11-20.) Plaintiff also claims that Reichle told Plaintiff that she could not train young 
CSRs “because the young people could relate better to a younger person” and that Reichle also 
told Plaintiff that she was “taking too long to close the branch” because Plaintiff was “slow” and 
“older.” (Spencer Dep. 21:15-23:12.)
G. Plaintiffs FMLA Leave
While working at the Brentwood Branch on September 4, 2007, Plaintiff was taken by 
ambulance to the hospital after suffering what initially appeared to be a heart attack. Plaintiff 
remained in the hospital until September 7, 2007, after being diagnosed with hypertension. 
Plaintiff’s physician released her to return to work on September 17, 2007, and Plaintiff provided 
Perko with a note from her physician reflecting the same. (Reichle Dep. Ex. 4.)
The record indicates that Plaintiff was audited on September 17, 2007, the day she 
returned from her FMLA leave. Plaintiff’s drawer again was out of balance. On September 19, 
2007, Perko and Stone issued Plaintiff a written counseling requesting that she “[a]dhere to all 
cash handling policies and procedures[,] [m]ake sure all night deposits left in [her] responsibility 
are accurately and promptly processed[,] [and] [fjollow branch policy for request for time off.” 
(Spencer Dep. Ex. 40.)
H. Plaintiff’s Resignation in Lieu of Termination
7
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Plaintiff was audited again on September 24, 2007. Because her drawer was out of 
balance, the Bank’s Retail Audit Department instructed the Branch Manager to perform “at least 
two surprise audits within the next month for [Plaintiff].” (Spencer Dep. Ex. 43.) Between 
September 19, 2007 and September 25, 2007, at Perko’s instruction (Reichle Dep. 50:22-53:17), 
Reichle documented several allegations against Plaintiff, including that Plaintiff had a negative 
attitude, was not in a good mood on a regular basis, and that Plaintiff was allegedly whispering 
to coworkers. (Reichle Dep. Ex. 5.) Reichle does not recall documenting any other CSRs. (Id. 
at 53:18-20.)
On November 30, 2007, Plaintiff’s fourth probationary period came to an end. At that 
time, Plaintiff was notified that if her performance returned to an unacceptable level within one 
year of removal from probation, her employment “may be terminated.” (Spencer Dep. Ex. 44.) 
Around this time, Perko documented several “critical incidents” relating to Plaintiff, all of which 
occurred after Plaintiff returned from FMLA leave. (Id. Ex. 39.) Of the six critical incidents 
documented in the log, all but one was an alleged policy violation committed by Plaintiff. (Id.)
Plaintiff sustained outages on her cash drawer on December 21, 2007 and December 28, 
2007, and she was again at a Level 4 loss. (Spencer Dep. Ex. 49.) Plaintiff maintains, and the 
record reveals, that part of her losses was later recovered. (Perko Dep. 158-160, Ex. 4.) At that 
time, Perko contacted the Human Resources Department, which recommended that Plaintiff be 
terminated. On January 10, 2008, Plaintiff was informed by Matt Justice, the Bank’s District 
Sales Executive, and Perko that her employment with the Bank was to be terminated. During 
this meeting, Plaintiff alleges that Justice told Plaintiff that leaving the Bank would “improve 
[her] health.” (Spencer Dep. 20:9-13.) The Bank offered Plaintiff the option of resigning in lieu 
of termination, which she accepted. Plaintiff’s resignation was effective February 1, 2008.
8
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II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). On a motion for 
summary judgment, the movant has the burden of showing that no genuine issues of material fact 
are in dispute, and the evidence, together with all inferences that can permissibly be drawn 
therefrom, must be read in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986). The moving party 
may support the motion for summary judgment with affidavits or other proof or by exposing the 
lack of evidence on an issue for which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial. 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
In responding to a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party may not rest upon 
the pleadings but must go beyond the pleadings and “present affirmative evidence in order to 
defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). The nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing there is a 
genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The task of the Court is not “to weigh the 
evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue 
for trial.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249. A genuine issue for trial exists when the evidence is 
not “so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 252.
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff seeks to establish her claims under the ADA, the FMLA, and the ADEA based 
on circumstantial evidence. Claims based on circumstantial evidence under the ADA, the FMLA, 
and the ADEA are analyzed under the burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See, e.g., Talley v. Family Dollar Stores o f 
Ohio, Inc., 542 F.3d 1099, 1105 (6th Cir. 2008) (applying the burden-shifting framework to an
9
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ADA claim); Bryson v. Regis Corp., 498 F.3d 561, 570 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying the burden- 
shifting framework to a FMLA claim); Martin v. Toledo Cardiology Consultants, Inc., 548 F.3d 
405, 410-11 (6th Cir. 2008) (applying the burden-shifting framework to an ADEA claim).
Under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must first 
establish a prima facie case under the relevant statute. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; 
see, e.g., Martin, 548 F.3d at 410-11. Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the 
burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the 
employment decision. See Majewski v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 274 F.3d 1106, 1113­
14 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that “[a] plaintiff’ s burden in establishing a prima facie case is not 
intended to be an onerous one”) (citation omitted). If the defendant makes the appropriate 
showing, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant’s proffered 
reason was a pretext for discrimination. Texas Dept. o f Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 
252-55 (1981). To establish that the defendant’s reason is pretext, the plaintiff must generally 
show: (1) that the proffered reason has no basis in fact; (2) the reason did not actually motivate 
the defendant’s challenged conduct; or (3) the reason was insufficient to warrant the challenged 
conduct. Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 576 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
Accordingly, the Court will first analyze whether plaintiff has stated a prima facie case 
under the ADA, the FMLA, and the ADEA. If the Court finds that plaintiff has stated a prima 
facie case under any of these statutes, the Court will then analyze whether Defendants have 
proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s discharge. If so, the Court will 
inquire as to whether a reasonable finder of fact could find that Plaintiff has shown that this 
proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination.
10
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A. Disability Discrimination Claims
In Counts IV and V of her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated 
against her due to her disability in violation of the ADA and Chapter 4112 of the Ohio Revised 
Code by terminating her employment. Because the ADA and Ohio disability discrimination 
actions require the same analysis, the Court will analyze those claims together under the ADA’s 
framework. See Mahon v. Crowell, 295 F.3d 585, 589 (6th Cir. 2002); Martin v. Barnestille 
Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist. Bd. o f Educ., 209 F.3d 931, 934 n. 2 (6th Cir. 2000); Maddox v. Univ. 
o f Term., 62 F.3d 843, 846 n. 2 (6th Cir. 1995).
To establish a prima facie case that she was terminated in violation of the ADA, Plaintiff 
must show that: (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the Act; (2) she is otherwise qualified 
for the position, with or without reasonable accommodation; (3) she suffered an adverse 
employment action; (4) the employer knew or had reason to know of her disability; and (5) after 
termination, the position remained open, or Plaintiff was replaced by a non-disabled employee. 
Hopkins v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 196 F.3d 655, 660 (6th Cir. 1999).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case because 1) she is not 
disabled under the statute and 2) she is not otherwise qualified for the position.
1. Disabled Within the Meaning of the ADA
Under the ADA as it existed in January of 2008,6 when Defendants terminated Plaintiff’s 
employment, a disability was defined as: “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an
6 The ADA was amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub.L. No. 110-325, 
122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (“ADAAA”). The ADAAA became effective on January 1, 2009 and it 
does not apply retroactively. See, e.g., Verhoff v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 299 F. App’x 488, 
494 (6th Cir.2008); E.E.O.C. v. Agro Distribution, LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 469 n. 8 (5th Cir. 2009); 
Vaughn v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-1027, 2009 WL 723166, at *3 n. 1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 
16, 2009).
11
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impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). From 
the briefing, Plaintiff appears to be arguing that she is considered disabled under the first 
possibility.
a. Substantially Limiting Impairment
The Supreme Court has set forth a three-step approach to analyzing the ADA’s definition 
of a disability:
First, the Court considers whether a condition is an impairment; second, it identifies the 
life activity that the plaintiff relies upon and determines whether it constitutes a major life 
activity; and third, the Court asks whether the impairment substantially limits the major 
life activity.
Williams v. Stark County Bd. o f County Comm’rs, 7 F. App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing 
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 630-31 (1998)). A limitation is substantial if a person is 
“[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which [she] can perform 
a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the 
average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.2(j)(1)(ii). Whether an individual meets the definition of disability requires an 
individualized inquiry. Sutton v. United States Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999). Courts 
consider the nature and severity of the impairment, the impairment’s duration, and the 
permanency or long-term impact resulting from the impairment. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2).
First, the parties do not dispute that Meniere’s disease is a physical impairment. As to the 
second factor, Plaintiff claims that Meniere’s disease substantially limits her major life activity 
of hearing. (Doc. 29 at15.) Hearing is recognized as a major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(I) 
(“Major Life Activities means functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, 
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.”) (emphasis added).
12
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The dispositive question, therefore, is whether Plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence 
to create a jury question on whether she is “significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or 
duration” under which she can hear as compared to the average person. Defendants point out 
that, although Plaintiff suffers hearing loss, she has testified that she did not wear a hearing aid 
and that her hearing loss did not affect her ability to hear customers or impact her ability to 
perform her teller duties.
Plaintiff testified that Meniere’s disease has caused total hearing loss in her left ear, has 
reduced her hearing in her right ear (Spencer Dep. 44:14-45:3, 74:4-10) and causes her to suffer 
from vertigo and constant tinnitus (id. at 124:9-11). Plaintiff also testified that she does not wear 
a hearing aid because it would be “of no value.” (Id. at 45:5.) The record reveals that Plaintiffs 
doctor characterized her hearing loss as “profound.” (Id. Ex. 17.) Although Plaintiff testified 
that her hearing loss did not affect her ability to perform her teller duties, Plaintiff went on to 
testify that she “developed a pattern” so that her hearing loss would not interfere with her job.
(Id. at 45:8-12.) For example, Plaintiff testified that she had to be “directed to [a customer’s] 
face” so that she could watch them speak. (Id.) She also testified that she “frequently did ask 
people to repeat” themselves and that her hearing loss made her job “more challenging” because 
she cannot “hear peripherally.” (Id. at 45:8-46:1.) There is nothing in the record suggesting that 
Plaintiff’s hearing loss is temporary.
The Court concludes that Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether her 
impairment substantially limits her ability to hear, as compared to an average individual. See, 
e.g., Perkins v. Hook-Superx, Inc, No. 05-cv-818, 2007 WL 1577751, *6 (S.D. Ohio May 30, 
2007) (denying summary judgment and stressing that the determination of whether a plaintiff’s 
hearing disability is substantially limiting is a “fact-intensive one” and “must be made on a case
13
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by case basis”); Boskett v. Long Island Railroad, No. 00-CV-7352 (RJD)(JMA), 2004 WL 
1305746, at *4-5 (E.D.N.Y. June 4, 2004) (denying summary judgment stating, “determining 
whether a hearing impairment is substantial necessitates a comparison between the plaintiff and a 
non-impaired individual. Fact-intensive inquiries such as this often require resolution at trial.”); 
Connolly v. Biderman Industries U.S.A., Inc., No. 95 Civ. 1791, 1998 WL 305643 (S.D.N.Y.
June 9, 1998) (denying summary judgment stating, “[w]hether plaintiff’ s hearing disability 
‘substantially limits’ one or more of plaintiff's major life activities is an issue of fact to be 
decided at trial.”).
2. Otherwise Qualified for the Position
In order to establish the second element of her ADA claim, Plaintiff need only 
demonstrate that she was objectively qualified for the position. Wexler, 317 F.3d at 574-76;
Cline v. Catholic Diocese o f Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 660 (6th Cir. 1999). “[A] court may not 
consider the employer’s alleged nondiscriminatory reason for taking an adverse employment 
action when analyzing the prima facie case.” Wexler, 317 F.3d at 574; Cline, 206 F.3d at 660. 
Instead, courts must analyze the qualifications of the plaintiff independent of the defendant’s 
nondiscriminatory reason for termination. Wexler, 317 F.3d at 574-75; Cline, 206 F.3d at 660­
61.
Defendants cite deficiencies in Plaintiff’s job performance in arguing that she was not 
otherwise qualified for the position. (Doc. 22.) However, these are the same reasons given by 
Defendant for terminating her, and, therefore, cannot be considered in determining whether she 
was qualified for her position. For purposes of summary judgment, Plaintiff has put forward 
evidence that she meets the minimum objective criteria required for a CSR. Specifically, in her 
seven years of employment, Plaintiff received multiple accolades for exceeding her referral goals
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and for outstanding customer service (Justice Dep. 55:4-56:9; Burchett Dep. 93:4-94:3), and was 
even promoted in 2005.
As stated above, for purposes of summary judgment, Plaintiff sets forth sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA and that she was 
otherwise qualified for the position she held. Defendants make no argument as to the three 
remaining elements that Plaintiff must show to establish a prima facie case of disability 
discrimination. The Court construes Defendants’ silence to mean they concede Plaintiff’s ability 
to establish those elements, at least as pertains to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has set forth sufficient facts to state a prima facie case 
for disability discrimination.
B. FMLA Retaliation Claim
To establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation under the FMLA, Plaintiff must 
show that (1) she availed herself of a protected right under the FMLA, (2) Defendants knew of 
her exercise of a protected right, (3) she was adversely affected by an employment decision made 
by Defendants, and (4) there was a casual connection between the exercise of the protected right 
and the adverse employment action. Skrjanc v. Great Lakes Power Serv. Co., 272 F.3d 309, 314 
(6th Cir. 2001). As to the fourth element, “[t]he burden of proof at the prima facie stage is 
minimal; all the plaintiff must do is put forth some credible evidence that enables the court to 
deduce that there is a causal connection between the retaliatory action and the protected 
activity.” Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 333 (6th Cir. 2007).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation 
because she did not produce evidence of a causal connection between her FMLA leave and her 
termination. (Doc. 22-1.) Specifically, Defendants argue that the “more than four month gap”
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between Plaintiff’s FMLA leave and termination “does not give rise to a temporal proximity.” 
(Id.) Even so, Defendants recognize that temporal proximity, in connection with other evidence 
of retaliation, can suffice to prove causation. (Doc. 22-1, citing Dixon, 481 F.3d 324).
Plaintiff has submitted evidence that she was subjected to substantial scrutiny after she 
engaged in protected activity. Plaintiff took FMLA leave from September 4, 2007 to September 
17, 2007. Plaintiff was audited on the day she returned from FMLA leave. On September 19, 
2007, Perko and Stone issued Plaintiff a written counseling specifically requesting that she 
“[fjollow branch policy for request for time off.” (Spencer Dep. Ex. 40.) Between September 
19, 2007 and September 25, 2007, at Perko’s instruction (Reichle Dep. 50:22-53:17), Reichle 
documented several allegations against Plaintiff, including that Plaintiff had a negative attitude, 
was not in a good mood on a regular basis, and that Plaintiff was allegedly whispering to 
coworkers. (Reichle Dep. Ex. 5.) Shortly thereafter, in December of 2007, Perko documented 
five “critical incidents” relating to Plaintiff, all of which occurred after Plaintiff returned from 
FMLA leave. (Spencer Dep. Ex. 39.) Finally, on January 10, 2008, when Plaintiff was 
terminated, Plaintiff alleges that Justice told her that leaving the Bank would “improve [her] 
health.” (Spencer Dep. 20:9-13.)
Thus, Plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence of causation between the retaliatory 
action and the protected activity so as to create an inference of retaliatory motive.
C. Age Discrimination Claims
In Counts I and II of her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated 
against her due to her age in violation of the ADEA and Chapter 4112 of the Ohio Revised Code. 
Because the ADEA and Ohio age discrimination actions require the same analysis, the Court will 
analyze these claims together under the ADEA’s framework. Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire &
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Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 357 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Under Ohio law, the elements and burden of 
proof in a state age-discrimination claim parallel the ADEA analysis.”).
The ADEA prohibits an employer from discriminating against any individual with 
respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination 
under this analysis, Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that 1) she was a member of a 
protected class; 2) she suffered an adverse employment action; 3) she was qualified for the 
position held; and 4) she was replaced by someone outside of the protected class or she was 
treated differently than similarly situated employees outside the protected class. See Martin, 548 
F.3d at 410. Plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of proving that age was the “but-for” cause of 
the challenged employer decision. Gross v. FBL Fin. Services, Inc., --- U.S. — , 129 S.Ct. 2343, 
2351 (2009). That is, Plaintiff must prove that Defendants fired her “because o f’ her age. See 
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); cf. Gross, 129 S.Ct. at 2350-51.
For purposes of summary judgment, Defendants appear to concede that Plaintiff has met 
her burden in establishing a prima facie ADEA discrimination claim. (Doc. 22-1.)
D. Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Explanation and Pretext 
Because Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, the 
FMLA, and the ADEA, the burden shifts to Defendants to proffer a “legitimate, non­
discriminatory reason” for its discharge of Plaintiff. McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802. Defendants 
assert that Plaintiff’s inability to balance her cash drawer and her repeated cash outages led to her 
termination. For purposes of summary judgment, the parties appear to accept that Defendants 
offered a facially non-discriminatory reason for their actions. The threshold question is thus
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whether Defendants’ proffered nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext designed to mask 
intentional discrimination.
Plaintiff can demonstrate pretext by showing that the proffered reason (1) has no basis in 
fact, (2) did not actually motivate Defendants’ action, or (3) was insufficient to motivate 
Defendants’ action. Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 
1994). The Sixth Circuit has cautioned that courts should “avoid formalism” in the application 
of this test, “lest one lose the forest for the trees.” Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 400, 
n. 4 (6th Cir. 2009). Pretext, the court observed, “is a commonsense inquiry: did the employer 
fire the employee for the stated reason or not? This requires a court to ask whether the plaintiff 
has produced evidence that casts doubt on the employer’s explanation, and, if so, how strong it 
is.” Id. The Manzer test can be distilled to one simple requirement: Plaintiff must produce 
sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could doubt Defendants’ stated reasons for its 
actions. Id.
Plaintiff attempts to demonstrate pretext under the first and second methods. As to the 
first showing, the record contains ample evidence that Defendants’ stated reason for the 
discharge was based in fact. The Bank had a policy requiring that tellers balance their cash 
drawers at the end of the day and properly process customer transactions to avoid incurring 
outages. The record shows that Plaintiff sustained multiple losses and outages during her 
employment at the Bank, resulting in at least six separate written corrective actions and four 
probationary periods prior to her termination. Plaintiff does not dispute these disciplinary 
actions, nor does she claim that they were discriminatory.7
7 Plaintiff claims that Defendants “did not follow written procedures when auditing [her]” 
because she was not permitted to witness one of the audits. (Spencer Dep. 17-16.) Even 
accepting Plaintiff’s claim as true, this fact is immaterial given that Plaintiff does not dispute the
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Plaintiff next argues that her balancing issues did not actually motivate Defendants’ 
actions; rather, Plaintiff argues, Defendants targeted her and ultimately terminated her because of 
her age, her disability, and her exercise of FMLA leave. In support of this argument, Plaintiff 
cites the following evidence: Plaintiff testified that she was audited significantly more than other 
younger, nondisabled coworkers (Stone Dep. 75-77, Ex. 6; Ahmed Dep. 24:2-5); Reichle, the 
Brentwood Branch’s Customer Services Leader, told Plaintiff that she could not train young 
CSRs “because the young people could relate better to a younger person” (Spencer Dep. 21:15­
22:1); Plaintiff was audited the day she returned from FMLA leave; Plaintiff was disciplined two 
days after returning from FMLA leave for failing to “[fjollow branch policy for requesting] for 
time off” (id. Ex. 40); at Perko’s instruction, Reichle documented Plaintiff five times between 
September 19, 2007 and September 25, 2007 (Reichle Dep. 50:22-53:17), most of which 
involved minor, arguably insignificant incidents; Reichle told Plaintiff that she was “taking too 
long to close the branch” because Plaintiff was “slow” and “older” (Spencer Dep. 23:2-13); and 
Perko also documented five “critical incidents” involving Plaintiff in the month of December 
2007 (id. Ex. 39). Further, Plaintiff points to the fact that although she was allegedly terminated 
for outages occurring in December, part of that outage was recovered prior to her termination. 
(Doc. 26; Perko Dep. 158-160.) Finally, when Plaintiff was informed that her position with 
National City was terminated, National City’s District Sales Executive told Plaintiff that leaving 
the bank would “improve [her] health.” (Spencer Dep. 20:9-13.)
outcome of this audit. (Spencer Dep. 175:19-21, 177:21-178:3, 178:14-15, 198:4-7, 199:10-12, 
201:18-19.)
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Construing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, as it must do at this stage of 
the proceedings, the Court finds that Plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence such that a 
reasonable jury could doubt Defendants’ stated reasons for its actions.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment as to the FMLA interference and defamation claims and DENIES Defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment as to the remaining claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
S/Susan J. Dlott_________
Chief Judge Susan J. Dlott 
United States District Judge
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